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Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System
Trevor C. W. Farrow1

At every level of the system – starting with
the federal government itself2 - a strong
preference is being voiced for getting cases
out of the public stream and into a typically
private, or at least confidential, alternative
stream. Small claims courts3, provincial
superior courts4, the Federal Court5,
and provincial and federal administrative
tribunals6 have all developed alternatives to
traditional, more formal investigation and
hearing processes. These are in addition to
the already available informal private tools
of negotiation, mediation and arbitration
typically available outside of a formal court
or tribunal setting.7

... [T]here is a real
danger that parties,
particularly those with

of resolving individual disputes and, more
broadly, modifying societal behaviour, both
public and private processes of adjudication
count as lawmaking tools.9

There is normally no issue as to the
power, will increasingly democratic legitimacy of the typical
legislative process. Further, in terms of
adjudication, contrary to the concerns of
use this privatizing
“judicial activism” critics, decisions made in
system in order to
open court, by appointed judges, pursuant
to fair procedural regimes, also, in my
circumvent public
view, usually accord with constitutional
policies, accountability principles characterized by democratic
notions of transparency, accountability
and the rule of law. Where a democracy
and notions of basic
There are many stated benefits to this
deficit comes into play, however, is not
procedural fairness.
trend of privatization. In terms of the
in open court with “activist” judges,
formal court or tribunal-connected tools,
but rather when the important societal
the overwhelming justification for their
ordering tool of adjudication goes
promotion is system efficiency: backlog reduction and savings
underground to private arenas, without the guarantee of
of time, money and other resources. In terms of Alternative
the rule of law badges of procedural fairness, transparency
Dispute Resolution (ADR) tools generally, proponents point
and independence of the decision maker. When decisions
to advantages including reduced costs and delays,8 the ability
are made in these private circumstances, we often do not
to choose laws, procedures and judges and the potential
know what they are. And in any event, to the extent that we
to maintain relationships. Typically the most important
do know, (which knowledge brings the broader behaviour
advantage, however, is the ability to avoid public scrutiny.
modification element of adjudication into play) we typically
When a dispute involves the private rights of A v. B, and
have no record or guarantee of the fairness of the procedural
further, when two “consenting adults” (including corporations)
or substantive legal regimes that were employed to reach a
have chosen to move their dispute off the busy docket of our
given result. What we are doing with our increasing reliance
public court system and into the private boardroom of an
on ADR, then, is privatizing a significant way in which we
arbitrator or mediator, current views suggest that justice is
make law and order our public and private affairs.
being served. The argument is that the resolution of disputes
So why are we so acquiescent and even seemingly
– like other goods and services – should not be deprived
disinterested in the current move to privatize the adjudicative
of the benefits of freedom of movement and contract in an
aspects of our law-making tools? That, in my view, is the
efficiency-seeking, innovative and expanding market economy.
democracy deficit with which we should be concerned. With
These purported benefits, however, do not come without
limited exceptions, we expect public hearings, precedent and
costs. Without public scrutiny – through open court
transparency in traditional court proceedings. Why then
processes, the publication of precedents and the application
– other than for efficiency and privacy interest preferences –
of case law to the facts to be adjudicated – there is a
are we so deferential to the concern of privacy when it comes
real danger that parties, particularly those with power,
to the use of alternative dispute resolution tools?
will increasingly use this privatizing system in order to
Reclaiming The Rule Of Law In Dispute
circumvent public policies, accountability and notions of
basic procedural fairness.
Resolution Practices
These procedural concerns are clearly significant. In
addition, however, there is a more fundamental concern at
issue: democracy - and in particular, the way in which we
regulate ourselves in democratic, common law communities.

Law Making in a Democracy
Law in a democratic society is primarily made through
the tools of legislation and adjudication. Recognizing that
adjudication plays an ordering role in society both in terms
Spring 2006
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In opposition to those who relegate public procedures
honouring basic rule of law values to the background
in favour of modern, consensually-based private dispute
resolution regimes, I argue for increased transparency and
accountability in current and emerging approaches to dispute
resolution. The potential strengths of dispute resolution
alternatives, particularly in free market economies must, of
course, be recognized. When carefully crafted, however,
such mechanisms can effectively secure rule of law values,
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while still facilitating many of the efficiency and accessibility
goals of more privatized dispute resolution processes.
But when it comes to a conflict between cost saving and
efficiency on the one hand and transparent procedural justice
on the other – particularly in cases involving issues of public
interest – the latter must always trump.10
There is no more important topic in law than the procedural
rules by which our democratic system operates. Important
parts of that system are the processes by which disputes are
resolved. Without sound, accountable, yet creative dispute
resolution processes, we potentially jeopardize individual
rights, together with underlying collective democratic values.
In my view, current trends of privatization in the context of
dispute resolution processes, are potentially putting those
rights and values at risk. As such, we need to question our
current trend of privileging the private over the public. And
in any event, if we are going to continue experimenting
with privatized civil justice – and it is likely that we will
(and is some cases should) – we should only do so with full
disclosure to the public regarding the rationalizations for,
and implications of, these tools. To date, the public is largely
unaware of the aggressive and systematic privatization of its
public civil justice system. The resulting democratic deficit
jeopardizes one of the foundational tenets of our civil justice
system and our common law system of governance as a
whole.
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This article is an edited, condensed version of a longer paper
on the same topic. I am grateful to Kim Taylor, Program
Director of the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice for helpful
substantive comments and significant editing assistance.
 ee for example the Dispute Resolution Centre for Excellence
S
(“DRCE”) established by the Department of Justice in 1992.
The DRCE – “devoted to the prevention and management
of disputes” in Canada – has a mandate “to serve as a leading
centre of DR excellence in Canada.” DRCE, “DRS Programs
and Services”, online: Government of Canada http://canada.
justice.gc.ca/en/ps/drs/drs_programs.html. The DRCE’s
stated role is “to promote a greater understanding of DR and
assist in the integration of DR into the policies, operations
and practices of departments and agencies of the Government
of Canada, Crown Corporations, federal tribunals and
administrative agencies, and federally constituted courts.”
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3	For example, the mediation program in Alberta’s Provincial
Court: “Mediation and the Provincial Court”, online: Alberta
Courts http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/pc/civil/publication/
mediation_and_the_provincial_court.htm.
4	See, for example, Ontario’s mandatory mediation programs:
Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended,
R. 24.1; Superior Court of Justice, Toronto Region, “Practice
Direction – Backlog Reduction/Best Practices Initiative” (in
effect 31 December 2004), online: Ontario Courts http://
www.ontariocourts.on.ca/superior_court_justice/notices/
casemanagement.htm. In Alberta, see Court of Queen’s
Bench of Alberta, Civil Practice Note No. 11, “Court Annexed
Mediation” (effective 1 September 2004), online: Alberta
Courts http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/qb/practicenotes/
civil/pn11CourtAnnexedMediation.pdf. For a discussion of
the Judicial Dispute Resolution program in Alberta’s Court
of Queen’s Bench, see, for example, The Honourable Justice
John A. Agrios, “A Handbook on Judicial Dispute Resolution
for Canadian Lawyers”, Version 1.1 (January 2004), online:
Canadian Bar Association – Alberta http://www.cba.org/alberta/
PDF/JDR%20Handbook.pdf.
5

 ee Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, pt. 9, rules 386S
391, online: Government of Canada http://laws.justice.gc.ca/
en/F-7/SOR-98-106/105374.html.

6

See for example Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (“AEUB”),
“What about Appropriate Dispute Resolution?” online: AEUB
http://www.eub.gov.ab.ca/bbs/public/adr/ADRPamphlet.pdf .
See also the Canadian Human Rights Commission (“CHRC”),
“Alternative Dispute Resolution”, online: CHRC http://www.
chrc-ccdp.ca/adr/what_is_it-en.asp.

7	For a general discussion of some of these ADR trends, see
Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil
Justice, and Legal Education” (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 741-754.
8	There is a lack empirical research, however, supporting the
existence of these purported time and cost saving benefits.
9	Here I am defining “adjudication” broadly to include courtbased, tribunal-based, arbitration-based and potentially
mediation-based dispute resolution processes, particularly
– with respect to the latter – when such traditionally nonadjudicative processes are directly connected with the results
of otherwise adjudicative procedures (like mandatory courtannexed mediation or mediation through judicial dispute
resolution).
10	An attempt at this balance – although still very problematic
from the perspectives of transparency and procedural fairness
– is the ADR process that is being used by the Immigration
Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada. Under that process, while allowing for confidentiality
at pre-hearing ADR sessions, an “agreement to resolve is not
confidential”. Allowing for the public knowledge of outcomes
is certainly better than blanket confidentiality on both process
and result. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada,
Immigration Appeal Division, “Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) Program Protocols” (amended 13 January 2003), online:
Government of Canada http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/about/
tribunals/iad/adr/protoc_e.htm.
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